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SOME REALISTIC THINKING ABOUT SECULAR
EFFECTS
PAUL E. SALAMANCA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding complaints about incoherence in Establishment Clause
doctrine,' courts by and large administer the Clause responsibly. They do so by
mediating between a number of powerful considerations, none of which can ever
be entirely disregarded. These considerations include, but are not limited to,
separation of church and state, the value of religiosity, the imperative of affording
equal treatment to religious and similarly situated nonreligious entities, and the
proper role of courts in a democratic political system. This is not to say that courts
cannot overstep their bounds and provoke an adverse reaction from other powerful
elements within the polity. It is only to say that courts, being sensitive to important
political considerations, tend to avoid the kind of provocation that would undermine
their role in the political system.
In Part II of this article, I briefly summarize the apparent incoherence of
Establishment Clause doctrine.2 In particular, I note that the various "rules" of
nonestablishment are logically irreconcilable and tend to undermine the significance
of the Free Exercise Clause, itself part of the Constitution. I then offer four possible
explanations for this incoherence, the first two of which are based on indirect
arguments and the second two of which are based on direct arguments. First, I
suggest that any rule, such as the Establishment Clause, that contains the seeds of
incoherence and that was originally intended to apply in limited circumstances may
well appear profoundly incoherent when applied on a massive scale.' Second, I
observe that the decision by most nations of the world not to disestablish religion
may be circumstantial evidence of the difficulty of the task.4 Third, I argue that any
government that expects to act rationally in all instances must predicate its actions
on some conception of the "good life," thereby implicating establishment.5 Finally,
I note that people cannot subsist as a matter of psychology without religion of some
sort; therefore, positive government must make religious choices in order to
function.6 These last two arguments partake of the "republican" approach to
lawmaking, which expects government and citizenry to support each other in
fostering individual and collective virtue.7
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. I would like to thank Richard
Ausness, Michael Healy, John Rogers and Peter Spiro for reading and commenting on drafts of this article. I am
also indebted to participants in the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Central States Law School Association for their
helpful suggestions.
1. Critics have often argued that the Supreme Court's intrpretation of the Clause is internally inconsistent.
See, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L REV. 311.315-17 (1986).
2. See infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of "republicanism."
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In Part III, I argue that courts nevertheless make sense of the Establishment
Clause by mediating between such logically irreconcilable values as separation of
church and state and republicanism.' To help illustrate this point, I use the
arguments set forth by James Boyd White in his monograph When Words Lose
Their Meaning.9 In one chapter of this work, White described a rhetorical
community in which players addressed each other by reference to a set of important
considerations, remembering always to include each consideration at some level in
their argument. As White noted, if any player in this community dared to eliminate
one consideration from the mix, as one did, that player risked outlawry and
destruction at the hands of the others. I argue that the same risks apply to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. If the courts systematically ignored an
important consideration underlying the Clause, such as separation of church and
state, the polity would react strongly and somehow force the courts to rectify the
error. I then list some powerful considerations that inform Establishment Clause
doctrine.'0
In Part IV, I bring my observations to bear on a specific rule promulgated
pursuant to the Establishment Clause. In particular, I note that the prevailing test for
implementing the Establishment Clause, the so-called "Lemon test,"" calls for an
empirical analysis of the effect of legislation.'2 Specifically, the test asks whether
the "primary effect" of a law under review is to promote or inhibit religion.13 I then
note that the Supreme Court typically honors this rule in the breach by expressly
disavowing any willingness to quantify effects.' In light of my earlier analysis,
however, I conclude that the Supreme Court should not engage in an overly
technical measurement of a law's effect, but instead should take the measure of the
law's effect as appreciated by the polity in context in making its ultimate decision. 5
II. THE INCOHERENCE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Arguably, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause less
coherently than any other provision of the Constitution. 6 This Clause provides that
8. See infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
9. JAMES BOYD WHITE. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS
OF LANGUAGE, CHARACfER, AND COMMuNrrY (1984).
10. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
11. The test is named after Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a complete description of the
Lemon test, see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text preceding note 91.
13. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
14. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
16. Justice Scalia once described the Court's prevailing test for non-establishment, the so-called "Lemon
test," as a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried ...." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). According to Justice Scalia, Lemon's secret is its
adaptability:
The secret of the Lemon test's survival ... is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and
our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three
prongs "no more than helpful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
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"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ." This
claim can be made notwithstanding the controversy that has surrounded such other
heavily litigated provisions of the Constitution as the Equal Protection Clause,"8 the
Due Process Clauses, 9 and the Commerce Clause, ° because interpretation of these
clauses, however controversial, has nevertheless tended to be coherent. Thus,
although scholars and jurists have debated whether the framers of the Equal
Protection Clause expected it to prohibit segregation in schools,2 whether due
process has a substantive component, and where the line falls between interstate
and local commerce,23 they nevertheless have drawn lines and made fairly coherent
distinctions.2
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Id. at 399. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L REv. 795, 800-10 (1993) (criticizing Lemon).
The Court first articulated this test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under this test, a law or official
practice is unconstitutional if it lacks a secular purpose, if its primary effect is to promote or inhibit religion, or if
it fosters excessive entanglements between church and state. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In 1997, the Court
appeared to fold the "entanglements" prong into the "effects" prong in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33
(1997).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.19. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. The Commerce Clause provides that "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
21. Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L REv. 1, 58 (1955) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no specific understanding that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited segregation based on race in public schools) with Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L REV. 947, 1093 (1995) ("[A] very substantial portion of
the Congress, including leading framers of the Amendment, subscribed to the view that school segregation violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
wrote:
While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison and subsequent cases, that
our Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes, state or federal, that violate
commands of the Federal Constitution, I do not believe that we are granted power by the Due
Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality
by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no
justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of "civilized standards of conduct."
Id. at 513 (citation and footnote omitted).
23. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial
may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to
those powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are
interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the
Commerce Clause always will engender "legal uncertainty."
Id
24. If courts interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require color-blind decision-making in some
contexts, yet to permit race-conscious decision-making in others, one could reasonably argue that equal protection
doctrine had become incoherent. But courts have largely managed to avoid this criticism by treating color-blind
decision-making as the general rule and race-conscious decision-making as an exception justifiable only in
compelling circumstances. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25 (1995).
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Establishment Clause doctrine, on the other hand, has been a largely incoherent
department of constitutional law. For example, myriad opinions of the Supreme
Court involving the Clause have relied on the necessity for "strict separation
between church and state."25 Nevertheless, the Court has approved numerous
programs that provide a benefit to religious individuals or entities on the ground that
the government is free to accommodate religion, within a broad range,26 or on the
ground that government is obligated to treat religious entities in the same manner
as similarly situated nonreligious entities. 7
These rules are not logically reconcilable. Moreover, strict separation, if taken
to its full measure, may preclude operation of the Free Exercise Clause, which
requires the government not to interfere with religious conduct. 8 As I attempt to
demonstrate later in this article, the Supreme Court manages to reconcile these
formally irreconcilable rules by mediating between important considerations. In the
next subpart, however, I will attempt to explain why we have an apparently
incoherent clause in our Constitution.
A. Indirect Explanations
1. Scope and Significance of the Clause
The present scope and significance of the Establishment Clause of today were
probably not even imaginable in the late eighteenth century. As several scholars
have noted, the framers of this Clause did not expect the government to which it
originally applied--the federal government-to manage many of the affairs of the
nation. Although they may not have seen the states as petty sovereignties after
ratification of the Constitution,29 they expected them to carry on much of the
25. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The Everson Court's words
on the subject are famous:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. (citation omitted).
26. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a "release time" program, whereby
students were released from public school for religious instruction).
27. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (requiring
a state university to pay the printing costs of a student newspaper with an explicitly evangelical perspective where
the newspaper qualified in every other respect for funding).
28. This is a longstanding argument made by many commentators. See, e.g., Alan Schwarz, No Imposition
of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE LJ. 692, 692 (1968) ("[It is arguable that the
establishment clause invalidates military service exemptions granted conscientious objectors, while the free exercise
clause compels them."). The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONsr. amend 1.
29. See generally GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERAusT: DESIGN FOR A CON OTrroNAL REPUBUC 97
(1989). Carey wrote:
It is not uncommon to hear our system described in terms of a cross between the unitary form
(wherein the central government reigns supreme over the constituent units) and the confederal
form (wherein the constituent units are sovereign). Over the decades this cross has come to be
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business of government, leaving Congress to police interstate commerce, to defend
the nation's borders against attack, to discharge the national debt,3° and to defend
political minorities against excesses in state legislation.3 These were the evils the
framers had in mind when they met at Annapolis and Philadelphia.
This has extraordinary meaning for the Establishment Clause, because, as Jay
Bybee has argued, it illuminates the Clause's role as a disabling provision.32 As
Bybee wrote:
The First Amendment is a subject-matter disability, as opposed to a procedural
disability. Instead of qualifying the conduct of governmental affairs, it puts a
category of laws beyond the competence of Congress. The disability is so
complete that Congress is expressly forbidden to enact laws respecting an
establishment of religion, or laws abridging the free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech and press, and the right to petition the government The First
Amendment is a rule about rules.33
Thus, the Clause was originally intended simply to disable Congress from
interfering with state choices regarding established religion. That meant, for
example, that Congress could not impose an established religion on a state, such as
Virginia, that had affirmatively disestablished religion.' It also meant, however,
that the Establishment Clause disabled Congress from interfering with a state's
decision to have an established religion, as was the case in Massachusetts until the
known as "federalism," which is generally considered to be-along with unitary and confederal
-a third and distinct principle for the distribution of powers.
Id.
30. James Madison wrote in THE FEDERAisr, No. 45 (James Madison):
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The
former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the fives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, TE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBuc 1776-1787 466 (1969).
Wood wrote:
As long as the revision of the Articles was based solely on the need to solve specific problems
of finance, commerce, and foreign policy, its support was erratic and fearful. But once men
grasped, as they increasingly did in the middle eighties, that reform of the national government
was the best means of remedying the evils caused by the state governments, then the revision
of the Articles of Confederation assumed an impetus and an importance that it had not had a few
years earlier.
Id.
32. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L REv. 1539, 1556 (1995).
33. Id. (footnotes omitted).
34. Virginia's legislature enacted "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" in the 1780's. See JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 103-04, 111 (1987).
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1830's.35 The Clause merely provided that Congress could make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, one way or the other. Only the states could do that.36
What began as a categorical disability on a government of circumscribed powers
evolved into a much more complex and challenging rule when applied either to a
federal government of virtually unlimited power, or to state governments, which at
least in theory possess the police power.37 The federal government has been a
"4positive government" since at least the 1960's, with the advent of Medicaid and
Medicare, and the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, and probably since the 1930's, which saw the enactment of the Social
Security laws. 38 This is in contrast to the "night watchman" or minimalist state
described by various political philosophers.39 Moreover, states, the theoretical
repositories of the police power, have been subject to the Establishment Clause
since the Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing ° in 1947.
35. See generally id. at 113-17, 139-60. Ironically, the voters of Massachusetts chose to eliminate the state's
mild support for Trinitarian Congregationalism only after Unitarian Congregationalism began to exclude
Trinitarians from public funding. See id. at 159-60. Noonan wrote:
Between 1820 and 1834 nearly one hundred Congregationalist parishes fell under Unitarian
control-over one-quarter of the Congregationalist parishes in the commonwealth. The
Trinitarians estimated that the Unitarians took $608,000 worth of property. The Trinitarians, as
they watched the process, became champions of abolishing Article Ill [which provided public
support for the religion established in each town]. The entrenched Unitarians defended the
establishment.
Id. at 159 (citations omitted). In a similar vein, John Witte has described a variety of measures designed to frustrate
unpopular faiths in the early years of the Republic. In fact, most, if not all, major faiths were subjected to
harassment somewhere in the Union. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L REV. 371,405-06 (1996); see also Everson v. Board of
Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 14 & n. 17 (1947) (discussing discrimination on the basis of faith in the individual
states after the adoption of the First Amendment).
36. See Witte, supra note 35, at 404-05.
37. An analogous situation arose in connection with judicially recognized private rights of action arising
from acts of Congress. Given the original legislation's failure to authorize, much less specify the contours of, such
rights of action, courts found themselves bereft of guiding principles when subsequent litigation forced them to
identify the boundaries of the rights of action they had earlier recognized. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). As then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in that decision:
Having said all this, we would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able to
divine from the language of § 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] the express "intent
of Congress" as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule lob-5. When we deal
with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be quite consistent with the congressional
enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, but it would be
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule lob-5.
Id. (citation omitted).
38. See Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of Religion in Public Life and Official Pressure to Participate in
Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. C1N. L REV. 1093, 1152-53 (1997); cf. John H. Garvey, What's Next After
Separationism?, 46 EMORY LJ. 75, 80-81 (1997) (noting that "separationism" has vastly different meaning in a
society in which virtually all resources are controlled by the government; observing that "We are not yet at that
point. But neither are we in the same place we were during the eighteenth century."); see also Donald A. Giannela,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part 11. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
HARV. L REV. 513, 522-23 (1968) (describing a similar society).
39. See, e.g., CARL J. FRIEDRICH, AN INTRODUTION TO POLITICAL THEORY: TWELVE LECTUREs AT
HARVARD 17 (1967). Noting the development of positive government, Friedrich described President Roosevelt's
"freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" as "freedom through government," e.g., "freedoms which men can
only attain with the help of their government." Id. at 5.
40. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Thus, any attempt to understand how a provision of the Constitution could end up
appearing profoundly incoherent must begin with the observation that the "subject-
matter disability" presented by the original Clause would have had little to disable
and, therefore, would not often have been invoked. That is, the framers would have
given little thought to a provision that had remote practical significance at the time
it was ratified other than its function as a disabling provision. Consequently,
incoherence in the ultimate interpretation of the Clause would not have occurred to
them.
A second indirect explanation for the Clause's incoherence lies in the weight of
the undertaking represented by the Establishment Clause. Circumstantial proof of
this weight lies in our fellow nations' general refusal to make a similar undertaking.
2. Other Nations
Drafted for a government of limited power, the Establishment Clause is an
awesome project when applied to a government of general power. In fact, many
nations of the world do not make the attempt. Britain, our closest legal and political
relative, has at least a weakly established church.41 At the extreme, parts of the
Moslem world are far from embracing disestablishment.42 Even international
accords regarding religious freedom do not call for disestablishment.43 In fact, John
Witte has written that: "International law and many domestic laws regard the
material and moral cooperation of church and state as conducive, and sometimes
essential, to the achievement of religious liberty."'
This is a complex argument that bears elaboration. Many nations of the world
believe that morally sentient progress requires government to maintain some form
of open-ended relationship with at least one religious tradition.45 At a formal level,
the United States rejects this.
This does not mean, of course, that the United States is unique in its choice to
disestablish religion. France, for instance, has formally disestablished the Roman
Catholic Church. But the relative rarity of our choice is circumstantial evidence that
it is a difficult one to implement.
41. See generally James W. Torke, The English Religious Establishment, 12 J.L & RELIGION 399,405-06
(1995-96) ("The nature of the Church of England and its place in English life cannot be fully understood without
a sense of its history. The Church predates not only England itself but even the sense of the English as a distinct
people."). Torke also wrote: "[F]or practical purposes, the present relationship of church and state in England may
be seen as a kind of dualism with the Church a distinct and relatively autonomous institution, yet still bearing much
national symbolic weight and still enjoying an official voice in the House of Lords." Id. at 410.
42. See Witte, supra note 35, at 440 ("Islamic revivalists in various countries urge... arrangements to
enhance the 'Islamicization' of the community." (footnote omitted)).
43. According to John Witte, neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, nor
the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief of 1981, nor the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of
the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1989 call for
disestablishment, even though these documents call at length for freedom of exercise, conscience and belief. See
id. at 434-40 (describing international legal instruments relating to religious freedom).
44. Id. at 440.
45. See Salamanca, supra note 38, at 1105 n. 57 (quoting Anwar Ibrahim, Religion and Politics, East and
West, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1996, at AI4).
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B. Direct Claims
Now I would like to make my claims more directly, and I would like to do so
from two different directions: legal and psychological.
1. The Legal Argument
At an abstract level, absolute nonestablishment and substantive due process are
not compatible. The most elementary rule of substantive due process is that a law
must not be irrational. That is, it must not be arbitrary or purposeless.' As
thousands of law students learn every year, even a law that regulates economic
phenomena must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.47 In
other words, there must be some rational argument connecting what the legislature
does with what it wants to do.
Some observations can be made in light of this. For an act to be "rational," it
must be consistent with an underlying principle. For that underlying principle to be
rational, it in turn must be consistent with a deeper, more profound principle, and
so on. Now these arguments concededly approach two famous and not generally
accepted proofs of the existence of God. Aquinas, for instance, talked about the
"prime mover"-the rationale, if you will, that needs no rationale." And Anselm
talked about "that than which there is no thing greater"--the all-encompassing
rationale.49 I will make no claim to have succeeded where these two individuals
failed. But if there is a characteristic that is common to all rational acts, whatever
that characteristic is--Chris Gamwell has referred to it as the "comprehensive
condition" that "makes human activity as such authentic"°---then there is a basis
for the argument that, in order to satisfy the most basic rule of due process,
government must have some ultimate vision of the good life in mind whenever it
acts.5" Otherwise, it is irrational. If this is so, then government cannot act without
predicating its actions on religious values.
Now I concede that this argument is ambitious. But it is only strained if one
thinks of "religion" as dogma and traditional faith-as something associated with
buildings made of clapboard or stone. We need not think of religion in that way.
Instead, we can think of religion as the assembly of values and beliefs that makes
46. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L REV. 309, 322-23 (1993).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Camlene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators." (footnote omitted)).
48. See Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L REV. 427, 428-34
(1997) (discussing the "cosmological proof of God" and the "argument from design").
49. See id. at 434-37 (discussing the "ontological proof of God").
50. See FRANKLIN L GAmwELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND THE
DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 24-25 (1995). Gamwell wrote:
An answer to the comprehensive question... includes an understanding of reality as such and,
in this sense, a metaphysical aspect. Every religion, then, includes a metaphysical claim about
the character of reality and, further, the claim that reality so understood makes human activity
as such authentic, at least in the sense that reality as such permits human authenticity.
Id.
51. See generally FRIEDRICH, supra note 39, at 77-78 (discussing political philosophy).
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individual and collective decision-making authentic and sincere.52 Once we look at
religion this way, we can see that it embraces many sources of strength in our lives,
and can include such varied phenomena as traditional religion and magic.53
Indeed the Supreme Court itself adopted a somewhat broad understanding of
religion in United States v. Seeger.' In this case, the Court included within the
definition of religion (for purposes of the conscientious objector statute in use at the
time) "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by ... God . . . ." When perceived in this light,
"religion"-and therefore establishment-becomes a requirement for rational
action.
2. The Psychological Argument
My second argument is psychological, and relates to human beings' innate need
for some form of religion. Specifically, this argument is based on the writings and
speeches of Carl Jung, who began his career as a follower of Sigmund Freud, but
who ended up striking off in his own direction. Whereas Freud looked very closely
at the sexual dynamics involving parents and children, Jung looked at a broader
range of symbols, and thus saw sex as one factor in a larger context.56
Much of Jung's work was based on symbols and interpretation of dreams. For
Jung, symbols could be "numinous"-that is, life-giving, psychologically genitive,
or more or less godlike.57 Jung saw religious symbols as numinous in nature. As he
put it:
Religion appears to me to be a peculiar attitude of mind which could be
formulated in accordance with the original use of the word religio, which means
a careful consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors that are
conceived as "powers": spirits, daemons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals, or whatever
name man has given to such factors in his world as he has found powerful,
52. See GAMwaL, supra note 50, at 24-25.
53. As I note later in this article, as a matter of psychology, people rely on a variety of sources for personal
spiritual strength. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. Sociologists of religion have made similar
observations. For example, sociologists have noted that people will turn to magic, as a supplement to traditional
religion, to the extent traditional religion does not respond to their needs. See, e.g., Rodney Stark, Bringing Theory
Back In, in RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND RELGION: SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 12-14.(Laurence A. Young
ed., 1997) (deducing propositions relating to religious practice). Among the propositions set forth by Stark is:
"Proposition 94: To the extent that the demand for magic continues after religious specialists have ceased
providing it, others will specialize in providing it." it. at 13. Another is: "Proposition 104: [Rjeligion. . . will tend
to oppose magic outside its system." I&. at 14.
54. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
55. Id. at 176. To be sure, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished a so-called "philosophy" from a
"religiofi" in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). But that distinction has not been free from
scholarly criticism. See, e.g., George C. Freeman, I, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
"Religion," 71 GEO. LJ. 1519, 1559-60 (1983).
56. See CARLmG. JUNG, MEmoRIES, DREAMS, RE= ONS 149-50 (Aniela Jafft, recorder and ed., Richard
& Clara Winston, trans., 1963). Jung wrote:
Freud's attitude toward the spirit seemed to me highly questionable. Wherever, in a person or
in a work of art, an expression of spirituality (in the intellectual, not the supernatural sense)
came to light, he suspected it, and insinuated that it was repressed sexuality.
Id. at 149.
57. See CARL G. JUNG, 11 THE COiLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG §§ 6-7, at 7-8 (Sir Herbert Read et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1969) (describing "numinosum" as "a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will").
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dangerous, or helpful enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand,
beautiful, and meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved.5"
Jung made no claim about the actual validity or truth of any faith. He simply
claimed to be a physician who observed phenomena in his patients' psyches and
tried to act accordingly.59 But the point for my purposes here is not the ultimate
validity of religion. It is its instrumentality in making sick people well, or helping
healthy people stay that way. If religion in a form authentic to the believer is
therapeutic to the believer, and if the state is somehow implicated in the process,
then the Establishment Clause is potentially problematic, because it instructs the
state to avoid establishing religion.'"
Now one could respond to this argument by saying that the state should simply
stay out of the way, and let people be as religious as they like. But that is not easy
for the positive state. The night watchman state could simply put a navy at sea, an
army in the field, and regulate the transit of steamboats between New York and
New Jersey.6 But the positive state is omnipresent. Most critically, the positive
state educates most of our young. Whatever the merits of public versus private
education, it is not possible to deny that many of the most controversial issues
involving the Establishment Clause have also involved education of the young.62
Ill. METHODOLOGIES
How does the Supreme Court handle this? And how does the constitutional
polity, which includes the Supreme Court, handle this? I want to try to answer these
questions in reverse order. In Part M, I will discuss the manner in which the polity
addresses the Establishment Clause by reference to the law and literature
movement. I will then try to assess the Supreme Court's work in that context in Part
IV, with specific reference to empirical means of measuring the religious effects of
legislation.
A. Rhetorical Communities
In one of his early books, entitled When Words Lose Their Meaning, Professor
James Boyd White discussed a part of Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian
Wars.63 In this part, various Greek city-states, the operative political units of the
58. Id. § 8. at 8.
59. See id. § 10, at 9. Jung wrote:
The psychologist, if he takes up a scientific attitude, has to disregard the claim of every creed
to be the unique and eternal truth. He must keep his eye on the human side of the religious
problem, since he is concerned with the original religious experience quite apart from what the
creeds have made of it.
Id. § 10, at9.
60. Cf. Salamanca, supra note 38, at 1153.
61. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (regarding, among other things, the licensing of
coastwise vessels).
62. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (whether a member of the clergy could deliver a non-
sectarian benediction at a high school graduation); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (whether a
public school could display the Ten Commandments on the wall of classrooms); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (whether verses of the Bible could be read in public school during the school day).
63. See White, supra note 9. at 59-92.
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time, were discussing their obligations and prerogatives vis-A-vis other city-states,
all in the context of a rebellion that had occurred in a particular city-state. 6
According to White, the city-states generally used three values as referents in their
arguments. These values were justice, expediency and gratitude.65 Although they
could argue with great creativity in light of these values, they could not entirely
dismiss them, nor could they distort any of them beyond a point recognized by other
city-states, without rupturing the rhetorical community that made these discussions
possible at all." This rupture occurred when Athens subordinated justice to
expediency and destroyed any other city-state's reason for talking to Athens,
leading to Athens' eventual defeat.67
B. Establishment
So too it can be with Establishment. Unlike the Greeks, we do not necessarily
name all the considerations that inform the development of the law, but we know
what they are, and we know that we cannot ignore them without peril. Among them
are separationism, equal treatment of religious and similarly situated non-religious
entities, and "republicanism"---the idea that religion is a good thing for individuals
and society.
1. Separationism
There is, to start with, the idea of "separation of church and state," which many
think of as requiring so-called "strict" separation. This value is critically important
to a great many Americans, if not the vast majority. But what exactly is it? Does it
mean that a city cannot put out a fire at a church?" Perhaps the most persuasive
answer to these questions lies not in how church and state can be separated, but in
64. See id. at 60. White wrote:
The first of the precipitating causes [of the war] Thucydides identifies is a dispute between
Corinth, one of the Peloponnesian powers, and Corcyra, one of her western colonies, which
leads by gradual stages to a meeting at Athens at which a representative of Corcyra asks that his
city be admitted into alliance with Athens and a Corinthian representative opposes him.
65. See id. at 63.
66. See id. at 65. White wrote:
The topics of appeal-justice, interest, and gratitude-are not fragmented, . . .but deeply
related, and for the most part they work together to form a highly coherent discourse. An
alliance will be expedient only if the ally has a proper character, after all, and justice calls for
different treatment of the good and the bad.
Id. He added later in this paragraph:
The topics of justice, expediency, and gratitude are apparently related in another sense as well,
namely, that they are all obligatory; for it appears that a speech that omitted any one of them
would be starkly incomplete, a confession of failure.
Id.
67. See id. at 69-70, 81-82. White translated the Athenians' arguments as follows:
For it has always been established that the weaker be kept down by the stronger, and at the same
time we thought we were worthy of rule, and used to be thought so by you until, considering
your own advantages, you began ... to use the argument from justice, which no one, when he
had a chance to get something by force, ever put before it and refrained from taking the
advantage.
I at69.
68. See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (raising this and similar issues).
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how much we want them separated, and why. After all, church and state do not exist
in separate universes, with no causal connections between the two. In addition, as
I will argue in the next few paragraphs, preference for separationism may at least
in part be attributable to distaste for traditional religion. I will note in conclusion,
however, that whatever the motive for strict separation, it is an important part of the
calculus.
Leo Marx, an historian of American culture, wrote a fascinating book entitled
The Machine in the Garden, in which he discussed the national psyche as reflected
in American literature.' With respect to the "garden" aspect of this title, Marx went
through several prominent literary works regarding North America, mostly by
writers in this country. Time and again he demonstrated the profundity of our self-
perception as a "virgin" nation. According to this national mythology, we possessed
the great opportunity that the Europeans never had, but always dreamed about, to
start fresh.7° Concededly, this mythology. had to pass over the presence of Native
Americans on the continent, as well as the experiences of people brought
involuntarily to North America, but Marx simply described the dominant mythology
of the nation. He did not seek to dislodge it. Moreover, he noted, this mythology did
not entirely ignore Native Americans. Instead, it sought to incorporate them into the
vision, as virginal themselves.7 In any case, Marx found this mythology running
through much of our literature. Perhaps the most evocative expression of this myth
identified by Marx is F. Scott Fitzgerald's description of the "fresh, green breast of
the new world" witnessed by the Dutch sailor in The Great Gatsby."2
This mythology may play a subtle role in separationism. Our land has not known
an indigenous god, or, to put the matter more accurately, the European-American
psyche has not associated a god with North America."' For the most part, we have
not brought religious warfare to our continent, nor have we permitted meddling by
the government with our religious institutions. We have maintained that aspect of
our virginity.
But this is only part of the picture. The idea of not having an indigenous god was
itself brought to North America by Europeans. It is part of a European panacea. In
fact, it is a fundamental aspect of modem psychology. As Carl Jung noted, the
modem psyche has largely moved beyond a projected god of personality to a
perception of a more symbolic internal god.74
69. See LEO MARX, THE MACHNE iN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL iN AMERICA
(1964).
70. Cf. id. at 36 ("What most fascinated Englishmen [about America] was the absence of anything like
European society; here was a landscape untouched by history-nature unmixed with art. The new continent looked,
or so they thought, the way the world might have been supposed to look before the beginning of civilization.").
71. See id.
72. See id at 360 (quoting F. SCOT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY).
73. Our inability or unwillingness to relate the landscape of North America to a deity or a religious cult is
exemplified in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), in which the Supreme
Court held that the federal government could permit logging and similar economic activities in a portion of a
National Forest traditionally used for religious purposes by three Native American tribes, notwithstanding the Free
Exercise Clause.
74. See JUNG, supra note 57, § 136, at 80. Regarding a circular diagram known as a "mandala" that Jung
would ask his patients to draw, and which he often examined for evidence of psychological condition, Jung said:
I have seen many hundreds of mandalas, done by patients who were quite uninfluenced, and I
have found the same fact in an overwhelming majority of cases: there was never a deity
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In this respect, the new world can be seen as physical space in which such ideas
can grow more easily than in a world filled with evidence of indigenous gods. Thus,
strict separationism can be seen at least in part as a desire to rid the world of "gods"
in the traditional sense, rather than as a simple desire to separate church and state.
This is not to say, of course, that only antipathy to a "God of personality"
underlies strict separationism. But it may explain part of the strong motivation for
separationism in our political culture. Other important considerations served by
strict separationism include preventing any single religion from dominating the
national political discourse," ensuring that individual religious choices are
sincere, 6 and protecting religious traditions and institutions from domination by the
government.
2. Equality
Another important value in the rhetorical community I have been trying to
describe is equality. From this value arises the notion that when government acts it
should treat a religious entity precisely as it would treat a similarly situated non-
religious entity. This value is gaining steam in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
and at times has threatened-but nevertheless failed-to overtake the debate."
Under the extreme articulation of this value, any amount of official aid to religion
does not constitute establishment provided the government does not confer the aid
to religious entities as such, but merely assists such entities because of their non-
religious characteristics. For example, this value would require a school district to
make its facilities available to religious and non-religious groups on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. It would also require the government to permit the placement of a
cross in a public park across the street from a statehouse if the government has
habitually allowed non-religious unattended displays in the same park.7'
3. Republicanism
A third value is the need for positive government to function rationally, and con-
sistent with the needs of the human psyche. Pressure is mounting to enlist religion,
or religiously oriented programs, in answering this imperative.'c For example, there
occupying the centre. The centre, as a rule, is emphasized. But what we find there is a symbol
with a very different meaning. It is a star, a sun, a flower, a cross with equal arms, a precious
stone, a bowl filled with water or wine, a serpent coiled up, or a human being, but never a god.
Id. (footnote omitted). Later in the same lecture he added: "A modem mandala is an involuntary confession of a
peculiar mental condition. There is no deity in the mandala, nor is there any submission or reconciliation to a deity.
The place of the deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man." Id. § 139, at 82 (footnote omitted).
75. See Witte, supra note 35, at 397 & n.130 (citing THE FEDERAUST NO. 10 79 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
76. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 10 (quoting JAMES
MADISON, MEMORiAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST REuGious ASSESSMENTS 11 (1785)) ("If '[tihe Religion
then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man,' each person must be as free to
disbelieve as he is to believe.").
77. See Salamanca, supra note 38, at 1127-39 (describing the "equal access principle" in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
78. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
79. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
80. For an interesting popular discussion of this issue, see Joe Klein, In God They Trust, TiE NEW YORKER,
June 16, 1997, at40.
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is pressure upon the government in many urban areas to help defray the cost of
private, sectarian education, the argument being that such education is more effec-
tive than public education.8 And, where the government already helps to pay for
private, non-sectarian education, the equality argument aligns with this consider-
ation of expediency. There is also Alcoholics Anonymous, a quasi-religious organi-
zation of which the government makes enormous use in fighting alcoholism and
drug abuse. 2 And the list goes on. Habitat for Humanity is a significant force in the
world of charity. It often receives public assistance in the acquisition of land, and
it is explicitly sectarian at its highest level.83 Thus, to facilitate government that is
responsive to the needs of the citizenry, government may need to be supportive of
religion.
At a broader level, the idea of divorcing religion and morality, on the one hand,
and the state, on the other, is not one embraced by the entire polity. Although it may
be embraced by much of the polity, there are strong traditions on both sides of the
issue,"' just as the Supreme Court has given us rhetoric on both sides of the issue. 5
IV. EMPIRICISM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
What we are left with, then, is necessarily a very complex picture of the
relationship between church and state in the United States and what the Constitution
permits and requires. The Supreme Court by and large addresses this issue with the
so-called "Lemon test," first adopted in the 1971 decision Lemon v. Kurtzman" 6 and
recently reaffirmed in principal part in Agostini v. Felton. Under Lemon, a law is
unconstitutional if it lacks a secular purpose, if its primary effect is to promote or
inhibit religion, or if it fosters excessive entanglements between church and state.8
But only one of Lemon's three prongs-the "effects" prong-may have real
meaning. In the 1997 Agostini decision, the Supreme Court seemed to fold the"entanglements" prong into the "effects" prong. 9 Moreover, legislation almost
never runs afoul of the "purposes" prong. This is because government's purpose is
81. See generally Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. CL 466 (1998)
(upholding a school choice program against challenge under the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution).
82. See Salamanca, supra note 38, at 1154-55.
83. See generally Habitat for Humanity International, Habitat for Humanity Fact Sheet (visited Feb. 12,
1999) <http:/www.habitat.org/howfactsheet.html>.
84. John Witte has written that the "Puritan" and "Republican" strains were roughly as powerful at the time
of the founding as the "Separationist" and "Enlightenment" strains. See Witte, supra note 35, at 377-78. Witte
wrote "[t]he so-called original intent of the American constitutional framers respecting government and religion
cannot be reduced to any one of these views. It must be sought in the tensions among them and in the general
principals that emerge from their interaction." Ia at 378.
85. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.") with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
needs, it follows the best of our traditions."). Although it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would reaffirm Zorach
today, it often upholds secular programs that promote an ostensible secular purpose, even if religion is a direct
beneficiary. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a tax exemption for
church property drafted broadly enough to encompass a variety of non-profit charitable entities).
86. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
87. 521 U.S. 203, 222-23, 232-33 (1997).
88. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
89. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33.
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rarely simply to promote religion. Government can almost always argue that it seeks
to promote a broad secular goal-"peace on earth" will do-with promotion of
religion being an unintended side effect.' Thus, in practice, the battle often boils
down to the effects prong. What, then, is a "religious" effect, as opposed to a
"secular" effect?
The word "effect" has an empirical sound to it. We can almost imagine
psychologists and sociologists measuring secular and religious effects of govern-
ment acts. But can this really be done? Paraphrasing Justice Scalia, can a rock be
heavier than a line is long?9 As a formal matter, there is no empirical way to
compare effects absent a currency into which disparate effects can be translated.
But the Supreme Court does not really try to measure effects. In fact, on two
occasions when measurement might have decided the case (were it possible), the
Court expressly disavowed a willingness to roll up its sleeves and measure. The
earlier of the two cases was Mueller v. Allen.' The more recent was Agostini.93
A. Mueller v. Allen
In Mueller, the Supreme Court upheld, under the Lemon analysis, a tax
exemption for parents' out-of-pocket cost of educating their children in any institu-
tion, public, private but non-sectarian, or private and sectarian." The Court had
little difficulty concluding that the statute satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test.
The Court concluded that an educated citizenry helped the state, that private schools
relieved the public of the burden of educating a significant number of students, and
that private schools provided a valuable "benchmark" for public schools.9"
The Court gave more attention to Lemon's second prong, however. First, the
Court noted that the deduction allowed under the statute was only one among many.
The state also permitted parents to deduct the cost of medical expenses for which
they had received no reimbursement, as well as any contributions the parents had
made to charity.96 The Court also noted that parents of all students-including
students attending public schools-could take advantage of the deduction.97 The
Court acknowledged, however, that the taxes foregone ultimately redounded to the
90. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-09 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lemon's
purpose prong). Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application because it has never been
fully defined .... If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian institutions
accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will condemn nothing so
long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says nothing about aiding religion.
Id. at 108. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing
legislative prayers and the printing of "In God We Trust" on coins as serving "the legitimate secular purposes of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society").
91. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (1988). See generally Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 711, 711-12 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court in fact does not balance
interests, but instead relies upon qualitative analysis).
92. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
93. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
94. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390-91.
95. See id. at 395.
96. See id. at 396.
97. See id. at 397.
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benefit of the schools attended by children.98 The Court responded to this
observation by noting that parents' decisions, not decisions by the state, dictated
whether or not money would go to sectarian institutions."
The most important aspect of Mueller for purposes of this article concerned
petitioners' argument that, "notwithstanding the facial neutrality of [the statute at
issue], in application [it] primarily benefit[ted] religious institutions.""° According
to petitioners, most parents of children attending public school incurred no expenses
for tuition at all, and other expenses deductible under the statute were negligible.
Moreover, they contended that 96% of the children in private schools attended
institutions with religious affiliations."' The Court's response was instructive, and
devastating to the empirical tenor of Lemon's second prong:
We need not consider these contentions in detail. We would be loath to adopt
a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports
reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits
under [Minnesota's] law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty
that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by
which such statistical evidence might be evaluated ....
... [W]e believe it wiser to decline to engage in the type of empirical inquiry
into those persons benefited by state law which petitioners urge)°
As the dissent pointed out, a significant effect of the legislation was the financing
of private, sectarian education, and thereby, the promotion of religion. 3 In fact, the
dissent described this effect as "primary,"'' " "direct," and "immediate."'0" In other
words, it was exactly the kind of effect that would fail Lemon's second prong.
B. Agostini v. Felton
A later decision in which the Supreme Court eschewed empirical analysis under
Lemon was Agostini."6 This decision involved the constitutionality of a plan in New
York City whereby public employees would enter the premises of private, sectarian
educational institutions to teach various remedial courses pursuant to Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965." In 1985, the Supreme Court
had ruled that this practice violated the Establishment Clause in Aguilar v. Felton.S
In addition, on the same day that Aguilar was decided, the Court invalidated a
98. See id. at 399.
99. See iti The Court has often relied upon this distinction. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986).
100. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400 (footnote omitted).
101. Seeid.at401.
102. Id. at 401-02.
103. See id at 411 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (I[A]ny generally available financial assistance for elementary
and secondary school tuition expenses mainly will further religious education because the majority of the schools
which charge tuition are sectarian.").
104. Id. at 409.
105. Id. at 405.
106. 521 U.S. 203.
107. See P.L 89-10,79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994)).
108. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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similar program based on local rather than federal law in School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball."1 9
The issue in Agostini, therefore, was whether the doctrinal underpinnings of
Aguilar and Ball were still valid. Concluding that they were not, the majority
overruled these decisions and upheld the New York plan."0 Three of the most
significant propositions upon which the earlier cases had rested had involved
Lemon's effects prong. They were: (1) that public employees carrying out their
duties on the grounds of a private, sectarian institution would incorporate religious
ideas into their work; (2) that the presence of public employees in these institutions
would convey a "symbolic union" between church and state; and (3) that provision
of these services to students would constitute a direct financial benefit to sectarian
education because sectarian institutions would be relieved of the expense of
providing these services themselves."' Aguilar involved an additional proposition
that monitoring the activities of public employees in sectarian institutions would
constitute an excessive entanglement between church and state." 2
The Agostini Court made relatively short work of each of these propositions.
First, the Court noted that it had "abandoned" the assumption that the mere presence
of public employees on sectarian grounds automatically causes state-sponsored
indoctrination or creates the impression of a symbolic union between church and
state.' 3 More importantly, the Court rejected the argument that the most salient
effect of the plan would be to help finance private, sectarian education. The Court
supported this rejection by noting that parents chose to send their children to such
institutions. The public money, the Court indicated, simply followed the parents'
choices. Therefore the benefit to religion was incidental and justifiable under the
equality value."4
The ostensible "neutrality" of the plan was clear to see, but, at least in theory, a
court adhering to the second prong of Lemon would need to ascertain the plan's
primary effect, irrespective of neutrality." 5 The majority rejected such analysis,
however, quite explicitly: "Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitutionality
of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian school students who happen
to receive the otherwise neutral aid.""... This is reminiscent of the Court's remarks
in Mueller.""
109. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
110. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237.
111. See id
112. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14.
113. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
114. See id at 228. The Court also refused to assume that the provision of services pursuant to Title I would
relieve sectarian schools of the burden of providing services that they otherwise would provide themselves. See id.
at 229.
115. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,878-79 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "basic rule" of the Establishment Clause is a ban on direct aid to religion,
whereas the idea of equal treatment is only its "marginal criterion"); Schwarz, supra note 28. at 730-37 (discussing
the implementation of a "no imposition" standard, which would require close analysis of various forms of neutral
aid that nevertheless facilitate religious growth).
116. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229.
117. At least onestate supreme court has taken up this verseofAgsani and Mueller. See Jackson v. Benson.
578 N.W.2d 602,619 n.17 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. CL 466 (1998) (upholding a school choice program
against challenge under the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution, stating that "[tlhe percent of program
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C. Whither "Effects"?
If the Supreme Court will not measure "effects," then what is the significance of
the prong? Well, if James Boyd White is correct, the answer is not "nothing." The
answer, instead, lies in how the constitutional polity responds to the Court's
methodology. This larger rhetorical community, of which the Supreme Court is only
a component, will tolerate, or even expect, constitutional provisions to be
interpreted with a certain amount of liberality, but only so much. Moreover, real
empiricism-that is, real measurement-would be a difficult, if not impossible,
undertaking for a laboratory, let alone an appellate court."' In addition, as White
noted, if the language that united a rhetorical community-such as the constitu-
tional polity of the United States-imposed unbearable restraints, we would
disregard it, and build a new community. If, on the other hand, the language
imposed no restraints at all, we would not bother to invoke it." 9 It is the virtue of
a vital rhetorical community that its language permits a great range of experimenta-
tion and ad libitum behavior, but nevertheless cannot be manipulated to mean
simply anything without ending the community.' The meaning of this for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that, notwithstanding its apparent "incoher-
ence," it actually resolves cases of great social significance and pays sufficient
homage to the text and history of the Constitution, all while preserving the idea of
constitutional discourse for resolution of subsequent cases.
V. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to demonstrate that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is only
"incoherent" if taken at face value. Notwithstanding the formal inconsistency of the
most commonly invoked rules of religious freedom and non-establishment-
separationism, equality, and republicanism-all of them can and do play an
important role in a thriving rhetorical community of which the courts are an
essential component. Moreover, given the circumstances under which the Establish-
ment Clause was originally formulated, given the momentousness of the project the
Clause represents, and given the importance of the underlying subject matter to a
functional polity, perhaps nothing more could or should be expected from the
judiciary.
funds eventually paid to sectarian private schools is irrelevant to our inquiry.").
118. See generally Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L REV. 60 (1956). In this
article, Professor Malone argued that, notwithstanding causal relationships between various phenomena, such as
two discrete causes that combine to produce a specific effect, our point of view and our point of reference often
causes us to identify one cause or the other as "the cause in fact" of the effect. In other words, Malone argued that
many determinations that we consider matters of empiricism are in fact matters of moral judgment.
119. See WHrrE, supra note 9, at 67.
120. Arguably, just such a thing happened in our own nation's experience with the Supreme Court's decision
in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404 (1856). in which the Court held, among other things, that an
African American descended from slaves could never be a citizen of the United States under the federal
Constitution. Within four years the nation elected a Republican President and the South seceded from the Union.
[Vol. 29
